



Averell Smith v. Regents of the 
University of California, 
4 Cal. 4th 843, No. S006588, 
93 D.A.R. 1712 (Feb. 3, 1993). 
University Must Provide Activities 
Fee Deduction for Students Who 
Disagree With Fee-Supported 
Causes 
In this proceeding, students at the 
Berkeley campus of the University of Cal-
ifornia opposed the manner in which the 
mandatory activities fee is used; part of the 
income from the fee is used to support 
student groups that pursue political and 
ideological causes. In considering the con-
stitutionality of the various uses of the fee, 
the California Supreme Court noted that 
two important principles were in conflict: 
the principle that the government may not 
compel a person to contribute money to 
support political or ideological causes, 
and the principle that the Regents, to be 
effective, must have considerable discre-
tion to determine how best to carry out the 
University's educational mission. The 
court noted that "if the Regents decide to 
implement educational programs that en-
tail burdens on constitutional rights they 
must ensure that the burdens are justified, 
and it is clear that they have made no 
serious effort to do so." · 
Accordingly, the court concluded that 
the only practical way to protect the rights 
of dissenting students is to implement the 
procedures outlined in Keller v. State Bar, 
496 U.S. 1 (1990), and Chicago Teachers 
Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
These procedures require the Regents to 
identify any groups that are ineligible for 
mandatory funding under certain constitu-
tional standards and offer students the op-
tion of deducting a corresponding amount 
from the mandatory fee. Students who 
disagree with the Regents' calculation of 
the deduction will be entitled to the proce-
dural safeguards articulated in Keller: "an 
adequate explanation of the basis for the 
fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to 
challenge the amount of the fee before an 
impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow 
for the amounts reasonably in dispute 
while such challenges are pending." 
The court also addressed the students' 
challenge of the use of the mandatory fee 
by the Associated Students of the Univer-
sity of California (ASUC) to lobby state 
and municipal governments; issues on 
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which the ASUC has lobbied in the past 
include a nuclear freeze initiative, public 
transportation fares, city investment pol-
icy, zoning, rent control, rent discrimina-
tion, the use of registration fees to fund 
abortions, budget cuts for the University, 
and mandatory student fees. The court 
agreed that even if the Regents had ap-
pointed the ASUC to negotiate with gov-
ernmental bodies on students' behalf, and 
even if the state had a compelling reason 
to do so, recent caselaw provides that the 
state still could not force unwilling stu-
dents to subsidize lobbying beyond the 
narrow subject matter that justified the 
requirement of support. Thus, the court 
concluded that the Regents may not col-
lect, from any student who objects, that 
portion of the mandatory fee that repre-




Funeral Security Plans v. Board 
of Funeral Directors and 
Embalmers, 
14 Cal. App. 4th 715, 93 D.A.R. 
3990, No. C0l 1460 
(Mar. 25, 1993). 
Appellate Court Interprets 
Provisions of State Open 
Meeting Act 
In this proceeding, Funeral Security 
Plans, Inc. (FSP) challenged the trial 
court's rejection of its allegations that the 
Board repeatedly violated the Bagley-
Keene Open Meeting Act, Government 
Code section 11120 et seq. On March 25, 
the Third District Court of Appeal issued 
a opinion which affirms in part and re-
verses in part the trial court's decision. 
The court first considered the interpre-
tation of the Act's "pending litigation" 
exception, which allows state bodies to 
meet in closed session "to confer, and 
receive advice, from legal counsel" re-
garding pending litigation. FSP insisted 
that the exception should be construed 
strictly, objecting to the Board's routine 
discussion of facts presented for the first 
time in closed sessions by either staff or 
legal counsel. The Board argued that the 
traditional scope of the attorney-client 
privilege applies to all closed sessions in-
volving pending or threatened litigation. 
The court rejected both arguments, find-
ing that "FSP's position offends common 
sense and the Board's position violates the 
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language, as well as the spirit, of the stat-
utory scheme." The court found that delib-
eration and decisionmaking are necessary 
components of "conferring with" and "re-
ceiving advice from" legal counsel. How-
ever, the court rejected the Board's prop-
osition that the attorney-client privilege is 
as broad in closed sessions as in all other 
arenas in which the privilege is invoked, 
choosing to leave that issue "to be re-
solved in a proper case in which the strong 
public policy ensuring open discussion 
and deliberation is weighed against the 
asserted need for the attorney-client priv-
ilege." 
The court then discussed the Act's re-
quirement that "legal counsel of the state 
body shall prepare and submit to it a mem-
orandum stating the specific reasons and 
legal authority for the closed session" 
whenever the Board meets in private 
under the pending litigation exception. 
FSP complained that on various occasions 
the Board failed to prepare the memoran-
dum, prepared it late, and/or did not in-
clude in the memorandum the statutory 
authority or the facts and circumstances 
justifying the closed session; the Board 
responded by asserting a defense of sub-
stantial compliance. The court, however, 
rejected this defense, finding that a state 
body has "the burden of proving a com-
pelling necessity for a closed session." 
Accordingly, the court held that the statute 
compels legal counsel to describe the ex-
isting facts and circumstances which 
would prejudice the position of the state 
body in the litigation if the discussion 
occurred in open session, and found that 
the Board did not comply with this re-
quirement in the past. 
The court then considered the proper 
interpretation of Government Code sec-
tion 11126( d), which allows a state body 
to hold a closed session "to deliberate on 
a decision to be reached based upon evi-
dence introduced in a proceeding required 
to be conducted pursuant to [the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA)]." FSP ar-
gued that the exception only applies when 
a public hearing has been conducted pur-
suant to the APA. The court disagreed, 
holding that the Board may seek legal 
advice and confer with counsel in a closed 
session about the propriety of proposed 
stipulated settlements, reinstatements, and 
disciplinary proceedings, as long as there 
is "a demonstrated prejudice to the public 
by open discussion." The court indicated 
that proving the purported prejudice to the 
Board's litigation posture would be more 
difficult when the Board is discussing a 
settlement of a disciplinary charge, as 
compared to when there is an ongoing 
investigation before litigation is initiated, 
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or when the Board is involved in civil 
litigation. 
The final issue considered by the court 
is whether the Board's two-member advi-
sory committees constitute "state bodies" 
subject to the Act's open meeting require-
ments. The Board-which was repre-
sented in this litigation by the Attorney 
General's Office-argued that its two-
member advisory committees may meet in 
private, relying in part on the language of 
Government Code section 11121.8, which 
states that the term state body "also means 
any advisory board, advisory commission, 
advisory committee, advisory subcom-
mittee, or similar multimember advisory 
body of a state body, if created by formal 
action of the state body or of any member 
of the state body, and if the advisory body 
so created consists of three or more per-
sons." FSP, counting the attendance of 
Executive Officer James Allen at the com-
mittee meetings, argued that the commit-
tees had three members and were thus 
subject to the Act under section 11121.8. 
The court rejected this argument, finding 
that Allen's attendance to answer ques-
tions and assist in the handling of matters 
before the committee did not make him a 
member of the committee. 
However, despite the specific applica-
tion of section 11121.8 to advisory commit-
tees-the type of committee here at issue, 
the court concluded that the Board's advi-
sory committees are also subject to the Act 
under the much broader Government Code 
section 11121. 7; that section states that the 
term state body "also means any board, com-
mission, committee, or similar multimem-
ber body on which a member of a body 
which is a state body pursuant to section 
11121, 11121.2, or 11121.5 serves in his or 
her official capacity as a representative of 
such state body and which is supported, in 
whole or in part, by funds provided by the 
state body, whether such body is organized 
and operated by the state body or by a private 
corporation." The court found support for 
this position in a 1982 Attorney General's 
Opinion which found that meetings of the 
State Board of the California Community 
College Student Government Association 
(CCCSGA) are subject to the Act because 
some of CCCSGA' s governing board mem-
bers are members of the local student asso-
ciation, which does constitute a state body; 
according to the Attorney General, "when a 
second body is financed by a 'state body,' 
and a member thereof QJ.lil member serves on 
that second body, the open meeting require-
ments attach to and follow that member to 
the second body." [ I 3: I CRLR l] 
Following the court's decision, the 
Board filed a petition for rehearing; on 
April 26, the court granted the Board's 
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motion. At this writing, the rehearing has 
yet to be scheduled. 
Warfield v. Peninsula Golf 
and Country Club, 
12 Cal. App. 4th 178, 93 D.A.R. 
437, No. A051828 (Jan. 8, 1993). 
Unruh Civil Rights Act Does Not 
Apply To Discriminatory Practices 
of a Private Country Club 
Peninsula Golf and County Club is a 
nonprofit recreational club located in San 
Mateo, which provides for the use of its 
members and invited guests a golf course, 
driving range, putting greens, golf and 
tennis courts, locker rooms, clubhouse, 
restaurant, bars, conference rooms, and 
other facilities. Although several different 
classes of membership are available, the 
only proprietary membership is the "reg-
ular family membership," which is limited 
to 350 members. In March 1970, the by-
laws of the club were amended to provide 
that regular family memberships "shall be 
issued only in the name of adult male 
person. Proposals for regular family mem-
berships shall not be approved for females 
or minors." The bylaws further state that 
upon termination of the marriage of a reg-· 
ular family member by divorce or annul-
ment, "the Husband shall continue to be 
the Regular Family Member, and all 
rights, privileges and obligations shall be 
his. In the event of an award of the Certif-
icate of Regular Family Membership in 
final judicial action to the female spouse, 
and the male spouse does not forthwith 
thereafter purchase the female spouse's 
interest in the Regular Family Member-
ship, such membership may, by action of 
the Board [of Directors], be terminated." 
Appellant became interested in the 
club through her participation in.golf tour-
naments, and suggested to her husband in 
1970 that a membership would be "great 
for the family." Subsequently, a regular 
family membership was approved by the 
Board and issued in the name of 
appellant's husband; appellant was not 
then aware that women were precluded by 
the bylaws from becoming proprietary 
members of the club. 
In February 1981, appellant and her 
husband divorced, appellant being 
awarded "all right, title and interest in and 
to the membership of Dr. and Mrs. War-
field in the Peninsula Golf and Country 
Club." When appellant requested that the 
Board transfer to her the regular family 
membership formerly held by her hus-
band, the Board voted to terminate the 
membership. At appellant's request, the 
Board reconsidered its decision, and again 
decided to terminate the membership. Ap-
pellant subsequently filed a complaint for 
damages and injunctive relief against the 
club and its Board, alleging violations of 
the Unruh Civil Rights Act and denial of 
the right to fair procedure. Following a 
trial, the court granted respondent's mo-
tion for a directed verdict based upon a 
finding that appellant failed to prove the 
club's status as a "business establishment" 
under the Unruh Act; the court also held 
that appellant lacked standing to pursue a 
claim for denial of the right to fair proce-
dure. 
The First District Court of Appeal af-
firmed. Noting that the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act "prohibits discrimination in the provi-
sion of accommodations and services in 
all business establishments,'' the court ac-
knowledged that the Act defines the term 
"business establishment" in the broadest 
sense reasonably possible, to include all 
private and public groups or organizations 
that may be reasonably found to constitute 
business establishments of every type 
whatsoever. However, the court found that 
truly selective, private organizations are 
exempt from scrutiny under the Unruh Act 
for discriminatory acts, stating that al-
though no formula-like solution may be 
employed to define a business establish-
ment, the functions and characteristics of 
the organization must be examined. The 
court found that the undisputed evidence 
before it established the extremely private 
nature of the club, and concluded that the 
business activities of the club are inconse-
quential when compared to the private and 
recreational focus of the small, fixed 
membership. 
Regarding appellant's cause of action 
predicated upon denial of the common law 
right to fair procedure, the First District 
explained that the right of fair procedures 
as a component of due process recognizes 
that private associations may possess sub-
s tan ti al power either to thwart an 
individual's pursuit of a lawful trade or 
profession, or to control the terms and 
conditions under which it is practiced; ac-
cordingly, one may not be expelled from 
membership in a private association with-
out compliance with minimum due pro-
cess requirements. Because appellant en-
joyed the benefits and privileges of the 
club through her legal right of access to 
and use of the facilities, the court found 
that appellant had standing to assert her 
right to fair procedures associated with her 
expulsion from enjoyment of club facili-
ties and exclusion from holding a propri-
etary membership. 
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However, the court stated that the com-
mon law requirement of fair procedure does 
not compel formal proceedings with all the 
embellishments of a court trial, nor adher-
ence to a single mode of process; it may be 
satisfied by any one of a variety of proce-
dures which afford a fair opportunity for an 
applicant to present his/her position. The 
court found that "appellant was not im-
mediately and summarily expelled from the 
club and use of its facilities." Based on the 
record, the court found that appellant had not 
been denied the opportunity to present her 
response to the Board's action, and con-
cluded that, "[u]nder the circumstances, we 
find no denial of the right to fair procedure." 
On March 25, the California Supreme 
Court granted appellant's petition for review. 
Hull v. Rossi, 
13 Cal. App. 4th 1763, 93 D.A.R. 
3129, No. B061652 (Mar. 9, 1993). 
California's Private Attorney 
General Statute Mandates 
Attorney Fees Award in 
Ballot Proposition Dispute 
In this proceeding, appellants Jeffrey 
Young and Joanne Miller appeal from de-
nial of their motion for attorneys' fees 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 
I 021.5, the state's private attorney general 
statute; the underlying action involved an 
electoral battle concerning the future of 
the City of Santa Barbara's water supply. 
Appellants signed two ballot arguments 
which appeared in the official voters' 
pamphlet for the June 4, 1991 special elec-
tion; their argument supported Measure 
"S-91," which advocated development of 
a water desalination plant by the City as 
an alternative to importation of water from 
northern California through the State 
Water Project. Appellants' argument 
against Measure "T-91" opposed a bond 
measure to fund City participation in the 
State Water Project. 
Respondents are members of "We Want 
Water" (WET), which sponsored, funded, 
and supported Measure T-91. Respondents 
and WET filed a petition for writ of mandate 
in the superior court, pursuant to Elections 
Code section 5025, seeking to have eighteen 
separate statements stricken from 
appellants' ballot arguments as "false and 
misleading." Respondents' petition for writ 
of mandate contained a declaration of James 
Stubchaer, a former local water official, 
chair of the regional water quality control 
board (Central Coast Region), and former 
president of the State Water Contractors, an 
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organization which advises on the admin-
i strati on of the State Water Project; 
Stubchaer gave his opinion why he found 
appellants' ballot arguments "false and 
misleading." 
Appellants were served with the peti-
tion and notice of ex parte hearing sched-
uled for three o'clock that same afternoon. 
Appellants obtained three local environ-
mental attorneys to appear and request 
dismissal of the petition. The court refused 
to dismiss the petition and ordered appel-
lants to appear for a hearing four days later 
to show why the court should not delete 
their ballot argument statements under at-
tack. Appellants were required to prepare 
and submit their written response within 
three days. Appellants' attorneys prepared 
their answer to the petition, responsive 
memorandum of points and authorities, 
responsive declarations, and over 300 
pages of exhibits supporting the ballot 
arguments. Respondents, over objection, filed 
lengthy additional evidentiary materials. 
At the hearing, the trial court rejected 
fourteen of respondents' claims and or-
dered minor wording changes in the re-
maining four statements. Following the 
trial court's ruling on respondents' peti-
tion for writ of mandate, both sides 
claimed victory and sought attorneys' fees 
under section 1021.5. The trial court de-
nied both motions, ruling that "no signifi-
cant benefit was conferred by anybody. 
All this was is a temporary media net." 
Insofar as respondents' motion was con-
cerned, the court characterized the 
changes made in the ballot arguments as 
minor, inconsequential, a "piffle," and a 
"SLAP" [sic] suit. Concerning both mo-
tions, the court stated that it did not think 
an important public policy was vindicated 
in this particular case; respondents did not 
appeal the ruling. 
The Second District explained that sec-
tion I 021.5 allows an award of attorneys' 
fees to "a successful party" in an action 
which has resulted in the enforcement of 
an important right affecting the public in-
terest if a significant benefit, whether pe-
cuniary or nonpecuniary, has been con-
ferred on the general public or a large class 
of persons, the necessity and financial bur-
den of private enforcement make the 
award appropriate, and such fees should 
not in the interest of justice be paid out of 
any recovery. The fundamental objective 
of the private attorney general theory is to 
encourage suits effecting a strong public 
policy by awarding attorneys' fees to those 
whose successful efforts obtain benefits 
for a broad class of citizens. 
Appellants asserted that they fully sat-
isfied each of the necessary elements to 
entitle them to an award of fees under 
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section I 021. 5. They contended they were 
the prevailing party and thus met the 
threshold requirement of being the "suc-
cessful party" in the action. Appellants 
also noted that a prevailing defendant as 
well as a prevailing plaintiff may recover 
under section 1021.5, that fees may be 
assessed against a private party, that the 
action vindicated the public interest in a 
full, uncensored ballot argument and in 
citizen participation in public debate, and 
that the trial court erred in stating, in es-
sence, that any reasonable judge would 
have ruled similarly without the extensive 
defense undertaken by appellants. 
According to the Second District, the 
public's right to an accurate impartial anal-
ysis under Elections Code section 3781(b) 
constitutes an important right within the 
meaning of section 1021.5. The Second Dis-
trict also stated that appellants "are correct 
that section 1021.5 draws no distinctions 
between plaintiffs and defendants as a 'suc-
cessful party,'" and found that appellants are 
equally correct that "[a] prospective private 
attorney general should not have to rely on 
the prospect that the court will do the right 
thing without opposition." Also, the Second 
District stated that the trial court need not 
rule in favor of petitioners on every single 
issue litigated for petitions to be "success-
ful" within the meaning of section 1021.5. 
Accordingly, the court held that in defending 
the action, appellants achieved a victory that 
was substantial and which qualified appel-
lants as prevailing parties under section 
1021.5. 
In reversing the trial court's holding, the 
Second District further recognized that 
"[d]enying appellants' request for attorney 
fees would have a chilling effect on citizens' 
willingness to participate in preparation of 
ballot arguments. The awarding of reason-
able attorney fees to appellants will discour-
age the filing of 'SLAP' [sic] lawsuits and 
'piffles' which chill the political process." 
California Radioactive Materials 
Management Forum, et al., v. 
Department of Health Services, 
et al., Senate Rules Committee, 
Real Party In Interest, 
15 Cal. App. 4th 841, 93 D.A.R. 
5904, No. C013930 (May 7, 1993). 
Legislative Committee May Not 
Require Formal Hearings in 
Agency's Consideration of 
License Application 
This original writ proceeding arose out 
of a dispute over an application for a Ii-
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cense for the construction and operation 
of a low-level radioactive waste disposal 
facility in Ward Valley near the City of 
Needles in the southern California desert. 
The petitioners challenged an order of the 
Department of Health Services (OHS) for 
administrative proceedings in a formal ad-
judicatory mode in connection with the 
application of US Ecology, Inc., for the 
license in question. Petitioners are US 
Ecology and diverse individuals and 
groups with asserted interests in ensuring 
the timely construction and operation of 
the facility. 
According to the court, OHS had al-
ready conducted "exhaustive administra-
tive proceedings" on the pending license 
application and OHS itself believed the 
proposed adjudicatory proceeding was 
unnecessary. Nonetheless, OHS notified 
US Ecology that it must submit to a new 
adjudicatory proceeding conducted under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
Government Code section I 1340 et seq. 
Petitioners contended that the order for 
formal adjudicatory proceedings was the 
result of unlawful coercion by members of 
the Senate Rules Committee during the 
confirmation hearings of Health and Wel-
fare Agency Secretary Russell Gould and 
Director of Health Services Molly Coye; 
the Senate Rules Committee admitted that 
it obtained an agreement for further ad-
ministrative proceedings from Gould and 
Coye during the confirmation process but 
characterized the agreement as a legally 
proper compromise between two branches 
of government. 
In concluding that the Senate Rules 
Committee's interference in the adminis-
tration of the law was unconstitutional and 
that the purported agreement with the ad-
ministrative officers was void, the Third 
District Court of Appeal stated that rele-
vant provisions of the state's Radiation 
Control Law expressly provided for com-
pliance with APA procedures with respect 
to rulemaking and in connection with ad-
verse action against a licensee, but not in 
connection with granting or amending a 
license. Further, the court stated that it will 
not imply a requirement of an APA-type 
adjudicatory hearing for granting or issu-
ing a license, noting that where the legisla-
ture has carefully employed a term or 
phrase in one place and has excluded it in 
another, it should not be implied where 
excluded. Therefore, the court concluded 
that the proposed hearings are not statuto-
rily required. 
The court then addressed "the real 
issue in this case, namely, whether respon-
dents are required to proceed with a formal 
adjudicatory hearing based upon a pur-
ported agreement extracted from nomin-
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ees during the confirmation process. That 
this agreement is the sole reason for 
[OHS'] intention to proceed with a formal 
adjudicatory hearing is beyond question." 
The Senate Rules Committee asserted that 
the validity of the agreement for further 
hearings presented a nonjusticiable polit-
ical question; it emphasized its view that 
the agreement was not coerced but was 
simply the result of negotiation between 
the legislative and executive branches of 
government. In rejecting this contention, 
the Third District found that the issues in 
this case do not involve a political ques-
tion committed to the determination of the 
legislature, but instead involve an uncon-
stitutional usurpation of legislative and 
executive authority by the Senate Rules 
Committee. "By injecting itself into the 
process and in attempting to force [OHS] 
to conduct the type of hearings it desired, 
the Senate Rules Committee usurped to 
powers of not one but two branches of 
government." The court noted that the 
Senate Rules Committee is one committee 
of one house of the legislature; its author-
ity is subsidiary and auxiliary to the legis-
lative functions of the Senate, and the 
legislature may not constitutionally dele-
gate legislative authority to one house and 
certainly may not delegate its authority to 
a committee. According to the court, to do 
so would violate the bicameral and pre-
sentment clauses of the California consti-
tution. Here, the court found that the 
legislature did not purport to delegate su-
pervisory authority over the Radiation 
Control Law to the Senate Rules Commit-
tee; instead, the committee assumed that 
power for itself. In doing so, the Third 
District concluded that the committee 
acted without legislative authorization 
and in a manner which would be unconsti-
tutional and void even if the legislature 
had purported to delegate such authority. 
Further, the Third District found that 
the Senate Rules Committee's action also 
usurped the power of the executive in vi-
olation of the separation of powers provi-
sion of the California constitution; having 
enacted a statutory scheme, the legislature 
has no power to exercise supervisorial 
control or to retain for itself some sort of 
"veto" power over the manner of execu-
tion of the laws. Having granted authority 
to OHS to execute the provisions of the 
Radiation Control Law, the legislature 
"must abide by its delegation of authority 
until that delegation is legislatively altered 
or revoked" by statute in accordance with 
the bicameral and presentment require-
ments of the state constitution. 
Accordingly, the court found that the 
Senate Rules Committee's assertion that 
the Director and Secretary's agreement to 
conduct formal adjudicatory hearings was 
the result of a legally proper compromise 
during the confirmation process is mis-
taken. According to the court, nothing in 
the appointive process suggests that the 
Senate may exact promises or agreements 
from nominees as to the manner of perfor-
mance of their duties; rather, the state con-
stitution provides an oath which, among 
other things, requires that officers swear 
or affirm to well and faithfully discharge 
the duties of office. Although the legisla-
ture may dictate the manner of execution 
of the laws by enacting a statute in accor-
dance with the bicameral and presentment 
requirements of the state constitution, it 
may not otherwise exercise supervisorial 
control over the performance of the duties 
of an officer. 
Finally, the court addressed the 
Committee's claim that although the 
agreement for further hearings originated 
with the committee, the Governor's inclu-
sion of funds for the proposed hearings in 
the Budget Act validated the agreement. 
According to the court, the Governor's 
request for and approval of funding for the 
proposed hearings does not represent a 
shift in his consistent position that the 
agreement was unlawful ·and the hearings 
unnecessary, noting that "[i]t would be 
foolhardy for an executive officer to fail 
to plan for contingencies, and that is all the 
Governor has done. In any event, the Gov-
ernor can no more concede executive 
power to a legislative committee than a 
committee can be permitted to usurp it. 
And the Governor's consent to an unlaw-
ful legislative act does not validate the 
act." 
Accordingly, the court granted extraor-
dinary relief requiring OHS to proceed 
with consideration of US Ecology's li-
cense application without regard to or 
consideration of the invalid agreement 
with the Senate Rules Committee. 
* 
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